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I presented a draft of these remarks at the conference on Linda C. McClain’s manuscript
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INTRODUCTION
I am delighted to participate in this symposium on Professor Linda C.
McClain’s wonderful new book, Who’s the Bigot? Learning from Conflicts over
Marriage and Civil Rights Law.1 All of the other papers in this symposium focus
on Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission2 (and thus
connect with Chapter Eight of her book, on claims of religious exemptions from
protections of gay and lesbian rights), while my piece will join issue with the
related Chapter Seven, on bigotry, motives, and morality in the Supreme Court’s
gay and lesbian rights cases. In this brief Essay, I cannot do justice to McClain’s
rich, insightful, and illuminating treatment of bigotry. But I can offer some
thoughts on the unnecessary and unfortunate focus on “bigotry” in analyzing
opposition to gay and lesbian rights that are deeply informed by and congruent
with those in her book.
Over the past twenty years, the Supreme Court’s analysis of the constitutional
flaws in laws denying liberty or equality to gays and lesbians has undergone a
significant shift—from forbidding illegitimate emotions to rejecting inadequate
reasons. I sketch that shift by examining three leading decisions. In Romer v.
Evans,3 the Court held that a state constitutional amendment—barring protection
of gays and lesbians from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation—
reflected unconstitutional “animus” against and “a bare . . . desire to harm [them
as] a politically unpopular group.”4 In Lawrence v. Texas,5 by contrast, the Court
concluded that laws banning intimate sexual conduct between same-sex persons
unconstitutionally “demean[ed] the lives” of gays and lesbians.6 I will leave
United States v. Windsor7 out of the analysis, viewing it as a ladder8 from Romer
and Lawrence to Obergefell v. Hodges.9 Finally, in Obergefell, the Court ruled
that laws not extending the fundamental right to marry to same-sex couples
unconstitutionally denied equal dignity and respect to gays and lesbians and
failed to afford them and their children the status and benefits of equal
citizenship.10
1
See generally LINDA C. MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT? LEARNING FROM CONFLICTS OVER
MARRIAGE AND CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (forthcoming 2020) (on file with the Boston University
Law Review). Page references to Who’s the Bigot? in this Essay refer to the penultimate
version of the book (indicated as “manuscript”).
2
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
3
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
4
Id. at 632, 634 (omission in original) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
534 (1973)).
5
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
6
Id. at 575.
7
570 U.S. 744 (2013).
8
See id. at 769-70, 772-75 (applying both animus and social meaning of denial
frameworks).
9
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
10
Id. at 2604, 2608.
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Thus, in Romer, emotions animating the denials of gay and lesbian rights
evidently played a central role, whereas in Lawrence and Obergefell, it was the
social meaning of the denials that was crucial. I shall argue that the focus in
Romer on emotions—”animus” and the “bare desire to harm,” which Justice
Scalia’s dissent equated with “racial or religious bias” or “bigotry” 11—is
unnecessary and unfortunate.12 I shall also contend that the shift in Lawrence
and Obergefell—to concluding that laws denying rights to gays and lesbians
demean their existence and deny them the status and benefits of equal
citizenship—puts gay and lesbian rights on firmer ground and better deflects
Justice Scalia’s and other dissenters’ allegations that the Court is charging
opponents of gay and lesbian rights with bigotry. 13
Some arguments against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation have
drawn analogies to discrimination on the basis of race.14 These arguments
typically presuppose that the wrong in racial discrimination is—in the famous
formulation of United States v. Carolene Products Co.15—”prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities” or bigotry and irrational hatred. 16 These sound
like strong emotions. When people make arguments for gay and lesbian rights
using such formulations—along with their “lite” cousins “animus” and the
“bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group”17—they provoke strong
reactions. Indeed, some conservative justices have objected that these
formulations disparage the character of the people defending the laws
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation when in fact their opposition to
gay and lesbian rights is rooted in sincerely and conscientiously held religious
convictions. For example, in dissent in Romer, Justice Scalia took umbrage at
what he interpreted to be the Court’s charge that people who support preserving
traditional sexual morality—as against what he would call in Lawrence the
“homosexual agenda”18—are the moral equivalent of racial and religious
bigots.19 And in dissent in Obergefell, Chief Justice Roberts objected that the
majority was tarring religious opponents of same-sex marriage with the brush of
bigotry.20
In the best justifications for rights of gays and lesbians, including the rights
to intimate association and to marry, such emotions need not play a central role.
Analysis of prejudice, bigotry, and irrational hatred—and their “lite” cousins
11

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See discussion infra Part I.
13
See discussion infra Parts II-III.
14
See MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 77).
15
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
16
Id. at 152-53 n.4.
17
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 634 (1996) (omission in original) (quoting Dep’t
of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
18
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19
Romer, 517 U.S. at 636, 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2626 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
12
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“animus” and the “bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group”21—is
unnecessary to justify gay and lesbian rights. In fact, such analysis has proven
to be an unfortunate distraction—to be sure, an understandable one but a
distraction nonetheless. The better ground for justifying gay and lesbian rights
stresses that laws failing to afford such rights deny them equal dignity and
respect, demean their existence, and deprive them of the status and benefits of
equal citizenship without adequate reasons. Let us begin at the beginning, with
Romer, and then trace the shift in the ground for rights through Lawrence and
Obergefell.
I. ROMER: “ANIMUS” AGAINST AND A “BARE DESIRE TO HARM A
POLITICALLY UNPOPULAR GROUP” DENIES EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
TO GAYS AND LESBIANS
Romer involved a challenge, under the Equal Protection Clause, to a Colorado
state constitutional amendment forbidding the protection of gays and lesbians
from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.22 The state had adopted
this amendment after several progressive cities had passed local ordinances
protecting them from such discrimination.23
In Romer, decided in 1996, the Court does not even consider certain familiar
equal protection arguments that were available at the time. First, it does not
consider whether discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, like that on
the basis of race, embodies a “suspect classification” that would trigger “strict
scrutiny.”24 Under this most stringent form of review, courts would require that
to be valid, laws employing classifications on the basis of sexual orientation
must promote a “compelling governmental interest” and must be “narrowly
tailored” to furthering that interest.25 Relatedly, the Court does not inquire
whether the legal measure being challenged, like measures discriminating on the
basis of race, reflects “prejudice” against a “discrete and insular minority.” 26
Under conventional analysis, such prejudice reflects bigotry or irrational
hostility toward such minorities.
Second, the Court does not address whether discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is impermissible discrimination on the basis of gender that
would invoke “intermediate scrutiny.”27 Under this relatively stringent form of
review, courts would require that laws, to be upheld, must promote an
“important governmental objective” and must be “substantially related” to

21

Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 634 (omission in original) (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
Id. at 623.
23
Id.
24
JAMES E. FLEMING ET AL., GAY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION 114 (2016).
25
Id. (discussing applicability of strict scrutiny to laws discriminating against gays and
lesbians).
26
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
27
FLEMING ET AL., supra note 24, at 114.
22
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furthering that objective.28 On this view, the constitutional flaw in laws
discriminating against gays and lesbians is that they aim to enforce traditional
gender roles upon gays and lesbians and therefore represent a form of
discrimination on the basis of gender.
Why did Justice Kennedy’s opinion of the Court in Romer not take either of
these two available doctrinal routes? My view is that Justice Kennedy was not
about to take the first route: he wanted not only to avoid taking the big and
controversial step to holding that sexual orientation is a “suspect classification”
analogous to race, but also to avoid implying that opposition to gay and lesbian
rights is analogous to prejudice or bigotry against “discrete and insular
minorities” like racial minorities.29 Justice Kennedy presumably also was not
prepared to take the second route: not only because he did not wish to take the
big and controversial step to holding that sexual orientation discrimination is a
somewhat suspicious classification on the basis of gender, but also because he
wanted to avoid resting the holding upon a complex and controversial normative
theory about sexual orientation discrimination and the enforcement of gender
roles not likely to have been acceptable (or even comprehensible) to many
people in 1996.
These were the two main doctrinal roads to protecting gay and lesbian rights
not taken in Romer. Were there any other roads available at the time? There was
an emerging line of cases dealing with classifications that were not quite
“suspect classifications” but toward which the Court was somewhat suspicious
out of concern that majorities might be treating disfavored minorities unequally
out of lack of concern for, fear of, or hostility toward them. 30 Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno31 involved denying food stamps to needy individuals who
were living together but were “unrelated persons.”32 The law, the Court held,
was intended to prevent “hippies” and “hippie communes” from participating in
the food stamp program.33 The Court further held that a “bare congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.”34 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,35 a
prominent case building upon Moreno in this line of decisions leading up to
Romer, involved discrimination against developmentally disabled persons.36
The Court stated that “mere negative attitudes” of the majority of property
owners based on prejudice against developmentally disabled persons was not an
28

E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976).
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4.
30
FLEMING ET AL., supra note 24, at 114-15 (describing shift from deferential approach to
rational basis scrutiny with “bite” in analyzing justifications for nonsuspect classifications).
31
413 U.S. 528 (1973).
32
Id. at 531-32.
33
Id. at 534.
34
Id.
35
473 U.S. 432 (1985).
36
Id. at 435-37.
29
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adequate reason to deny a permit to establish a home for such persons in a
residential neighborhood.37 McClain richly shows how the challengers of the
state constitutional amendment in Romer drew upon this line of precedents in
formulating their arguments.38
In Romer’s majority opinion, Justice Kennedy argued that the state
constitutional amendment being challenged, which discriminated on the basis of
sexual orientation, likewise reflected illegitimate “animus” and “bare . . . desire
to harm.”39 Thus, in the first case to protect gay and lesbian rights in U.S.
constitutional law, Justice Kennedy invoked cases involving discrimination, not
on the basis of race or gender—which might have seemed analogous to sexual
orientation—but against needy “hippies” and developmentally disabled persons.
This might not seem an auspicious beginning for gay and lesbian rights! Taking
this route, the Court did not have to reach the controversial decision that sexual
orientation is like race or gender and warrants “strict scrutiny” or “intermediate
scrutiny.” On the other hand, the Court did not simply defer to and uphold the
legislation if one might reasonably conclude that the legislation was rationally
related to a legitimate governmental objective (the least stringent form of
judicial review in U.S. constitutional law). Instead, the Court applied what has
come to be known as “rational basis scrutiny” with “bite.”40 That is, the Court
put some teeth into the requirement that a law be rationally related to a legitimate
governmental objective—be justified by an adequate reason—and it found the
state constitutional amendment unconstitutional under that standard. 41
The good news is that Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Romer took a doctrinal
route that he quite reasonably might have thought would avoid the controversial
insinuation that opposition to gay and lesbian rights was as objectionable as
racial bigotry. Let us pause to observe, however, that “animus” may amount to
“prejudice” “lite” and that “bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular
group” sounds like “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” “lite.” 42
Furthermore, “rational basis scrutiny” with “bite” may turn out to be a “lite”
version of relatively stringent “intermediate scrutiny.” 43
The bad news is that Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Romer nevertheless
prompted Justice Scalia to object in dissent that the Court was “equating the

37

Id. at 448.
See MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 163-67).
39
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 634 (1996) (omission in original) (quoting Moreno,
413 U.S. at 534).
40
See FLEMING ET AL., supra note 24, at 115 (comparing rational basis scrutiny with “bite”
to “toothless” review of rational basis scrutiny).
41
See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
42
Compare id. at 632, 634 (omission in original) (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534), with
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
43
See JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 169 (2013).
38

2019]

ANIMUS, BARE DESIRE TO HARM, AND BIGOTRY

2677

moral disapproval of homosexual conduct with racial and religious bigotry.” 44
Justice Kennedy’s opinion, by giving a central role to “animus” and a
“bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group”45—instead of avoiding
the charge that he is implying that opponents of gay and lesbian rights are
bigots—practically invites that charge. We should apply a principle of
interpretive charity to Justice Kennedy’s opinion: he did the best he could with
the doctrinal tools available at the time. Like a good common law constitutional
interpreter, he reached for the precedents available—Cleburne and Moreno—
and, since they used the terms “animus” against and a “bare . . . desire to harm
a politically unpopular group,” he applied that formulation to the denial of rights
to gays and lesbians.46 Understandably, Justice Kennedy may have thought that
taking this route would avoid analogies to prejudice against racial minorities and
thus to bigotry. But to no avail. Justice Scalia wailed that Justice Kennedy was
charging opponents of gay and lesbian rights with bigotry anyway!
Was there an alternative route that Justice Kennedy could have taken in
Romer that might have avoided holding that “animus” against and a
“bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group” were the constitutional
flaws?47 Was there any other ground for the decision that might have averted
Justice Scalia’s accusation that the majority was tarring the opponents of gay
and lesbian rights with the brush of bigotry? In fact, there was another route—
which provides a bridge to Lawrence, the next decision protecting gay and
lesbian rights—and Justice Kennedy arguably took it as well in Romer. He
quoted Justice Harlan’s famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson48 that the
Constitution “neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”49 This
principle—the core of an anti-class or anti-caste principle—forbids government
to “deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws” by branding them as pariahs,
outlaws, or outcasts.50 The state constitutional amendment had done precisely
that to gays and lesbians.51 It was a “status-based . . . classification of persons”
that was not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.52
Under this principle, the constitutional flaw in the state amendment was that
it denied the status of equal citizenship, including the benefits and protections
afforded to other citizens, to a group of persons who were worthy of those
benefits and protections. Taking this route, what matters is not the illegitimate
44

Romer, 517 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. at 632, 634 (majority opinion) (omission in original) (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S.
at 534).
46
See id. (applying principles from Cleburne and Moreno).
47
Id.
48
163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
49
Romer, 517 U.S. at 623 (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
50
Id. at 635.
51
See id. (“We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals . . . to make them
unequal to everyone else.”).
52
Id.
45
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emotions animating the denial of equal citizenship—”animus” against and “a
bare . . . desire to harm [them as] a politically unpopular group”53—but the
social meaning of the denial—that gays and lesbians are pariahs, outlaws, or
outcasts. And what undergirds the holding that the state amendment is
unconstitutional is the normative judgment to the contrary that gays and lesbians
are worthy of the status, benefits, and protections of equal citizenship. Thus,
normative judgments that there are no adequate reasons for denying these
protections to gays and lesbians are an alternative—and superior—basis for
protecting gay and lesbian rights.
II. LAWRENCE: DEMEANING THE EXISTENCE OF GAYS AND LESBIANS
IS AN INADEQUATE REASON FOR DENYING THEM BASIC LIBERTIES
In Lawrence, the Supreme Court held that laws criminalizing intimate sexual
conduct between same-sex persons denied basic liberty in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.54 The Court dropped the inquiry
into “animus” and “a bare . . . desire to harm,” 55 replacing it with an inquiry into
the social meaning of a practice—laws that deny the right of intimate association
to gays and lesbians “demean their existence” and are not rationally related to a
legitimate governmental objective.56 In previous decisions, the Court had
recognized a right to autonomy and intimate association for straights. 57
According to Justice Kennedy, same-sex intimate association is analogous to
opposite-sex intimate association.58 And gays and lesbians engage in intimate
association for the same purposes and to pursue the same moral goods as
straights.59 Thus, Justice Kennedy concluded that gays and lesbians are entitled
to “respect for their private lives.”60 Accordingly, he determined that the State
may not “demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private
sexual conduct a crime.”61 Justice Kennedy implicitly judged gays’ and lesbians’
sexual intimacy and way of life to be as morally worthy and entitled to respect
as that of straights.62 This normative judgment underpins the conclusion that
laws prohibiting sexual intimacy between same-sex persons demean the
existence of gays and lesbians. At the time, Justice Kennedy wrote Lawrence as
53

Id. at 632, 634 (omission in original) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
534 (1973)).
54
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
55
Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 634 (omission in original) (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
56
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
57
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
58
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (“Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy
for [intimate and personal choices], just as heterosexual persons do.”).
59
See FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 43, at 13 (identifying moral goods of intimate
association to include commitment, nurture, and intimacy).
60
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
61
Id.
62
See id.
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a due process holding rather than an equal protection holding (although there
were unmistakable intimations of a concern for equality in his due process
arguments).63 In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy looked back and stated that
Lawrence intertwined due process and equal protection.64
Thus, the Court held that gays and lesbians, far from being pariahs, outlaws,
or outcasts, were entitled to equal dignity and respect. This significant shift in
the inquiry—from whether a law (1) embodies animus against gays and lesbians
and a bare desire to harm them to whether it (2) demeans their existence—
represents a transition from a focus on illegitimate emotions to an emphasis on
the social meaning of the law. The latter provides a better grounding for gay and
lesbian rights. To recapitulate Lawrence’s better justification: laws criminalizing
intimate sexual conduct between same-sex persons demean the existence of gays
and lesbians, denying them basic liberties extended to other persons without any
adequate justification for doing so. Affording these liberties is necessary to
secure the status and benefits of equal citizenship. These formulations were
prefigured in Romer’s alternative route, forbidding laws treating certain classes
of persons as pariahs or strangers to the law.65
With this better justification on hand, we can see that Justice Scalia’s
objections that the majority tarred the opponents of same-sex intimate
association with the brush of bigotry are overwrought and inapt. Holding that
the laws forbidding same-sex couples from engaging in intimate sexual conduct
deny such couples equal dignity and respect in no way impugns the motivations
or character of opponents. It does not charge opponents with “animus” against
or a “bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group.”66 It simply
recognizes that the social meaning of such laws—even if based on sincerely and
conscientiously held religious convictions—is to deny equal dignity and respect
to gays and lesbians. The fact that opponents act out of sincerely and
conscientiously held religious views is not an adequate reason to deny gays and
lesbians the basic liberties and status and benefits of equal citizenship already
afforded to straights. The recognition of this fact became central in Obergefell.

63
Id. at 575, 578 (recognizing that equality of treatment and due process are “linked in
important respects” but basing holding on due process grounds); see also FLEMING &
MCCLAIN, supra note 43, at 265-67 (exploring development of due process doctrine in
Lawrence).
64
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (“In Lawrence the Court
acknowledged the interlocking nature of [due process and equal protection] in the context of
the legal treatment of gays and lesbians.”).
65
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1995) (“Amendment 2 classifies
homosexuals . . . to make them unequal to everyone else. . . . A State cannot so deem a class
of persons a stranger to its laws.”).
66
See id. at 632, 634 (omission in original) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973)).
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III. OBERGEFELL: THE STATE MAY NOT DENY EQUAL DIGNITY OR THE
STATUS AND BENEFITS OF EQUAL CITIZENSHIP TO GAYS AND LESBIANS
In Obergefell, ruling that the fundamental right to marry extends to same-sex
couples, Justice Kennedy writes the majority opinion in the same vein as in
Lawrence rather than in that of Romer. Obergefell completes Lawrence’s shift
away from illegitimate emotions with a more fully articulated justification for
why laws denying basic liberties to gays and lesbians lack any adequate
justification. Here I briefly encapsulate the reasoning of Obergefell.
Gays and lesbians are entitled to the rights to autonomy, to intimate
association, and to marry, all of which are already protected for straights. The
state may not demean the existence of their morally legitimate way of life by
denying them these rights. They are entitled to equal dignity and respect. The
state has created an important institution—civil marriage—to promote certain
noble purposes and moral goods. In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy quotes the
stirring language from Griswold v. Connecticut67 about the noble purposes of
marriage: promoting intimacy, harmony, and loyalty within a worthy
relationship.68 He also quotes the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s
formulation concerning moral goods in Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health69: because marriage “fulfills yearnings for security, safe haven, and
connection that express our common humanity, civil marriage is an esteemed
institution, and the decision whether and whom to marry is among life’s
momentous acts of self-definition.”70 The Goodridge court also mentions the
moral goods of commitment, “mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and
family.”71 Same-sex couples are similarly situated to opposite-sex couples with
respect to the pursuit of such moral goods and the need for the benefits of
marriage. There is no adequate reason for denying them this right and these
benefits. Not extending the fundamental right to marry to same-sex couples
demeans their existence and humiliates them and their children, denying them
the status and benefits of equal citizenship.72
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell was based primarily on the
ground that the law denied the fundamental right to marry in violation of the
Due Process Clause rather than on the ground that it violated the Equal
Protection Clause. Again, Justice Kennedy may have primarily grounded the
decision on the Due Process Clause instead of the Equal Protection Clause to
avoid the need to draw analogies between discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation and discrimination on the basis of race. He presumably does so to
avoid implying that opponents of gay and lesbian rights are analogous to racial
or religious bigots. Nonetheless, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and
67
68
69
70
71
72

381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599-600 (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486).
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (quoting Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955).
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604, 2608.
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Alito in their dissents in Obergefell contended that the majority opinion had
portrayed those who did not share its understanding of marriage as bigoted. 73
For example, Justice Alito warned that the majority’s decision would be “used
to vilify Americans who are unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy,” and that,
while “those who cling to old beliefs will be able to whisper their thoughts in
the recesses of their homes, . . . if they repeat those views in public, they will
risk being labeled as bigots and treated as such by governments, employers, and
schools.”74
As McClain clear-headedly demonstrates, these charges ignore what Justice
Kennedy’s opinion in Obergefell says and does.75 In fact, Justice Kennedy
nowhere refers to those who oppose allowing same-sex couples to marry as
bigots; to the contrary, he stresses that he does not doubt the sincerity of
opponents of same-sex marriage. Moreover, he emphasizes that he is not
disparaging their conscientious religious convictions: “Many who deem samesex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable
religious or philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are
disparaged here.”76 He also states: “[R]eligions, and those who adhere to
religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction
that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned.”77 But he
explains that “when that sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted into law
and public policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the
State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own
liberty is then denied.”78
This passage reflects important constitutional limits upon the legal
enforcement of morality in a pluralistic constitutional democracy: however
sincere their beliefs, citizens may not use the vehicle of the law to exclude others
from basic civil institutions. Saying that a law which is sincerely defended by
people of conscience denies gays and lesbians equal dignity—by denying them
the status and benefits of equal citizenship where a basic civil institution like
marriage is concerned—is hardly to tar those people with the brush of bigotry.
In any case, nothing in Justice Kennedy’s opinion precludes states from enacting
measures or using existing laws to protect religious liberty, provided they do not
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run afoul of the Court’s holding that same-sex couples must be allowed to
exercise the fundamental right to marry in all states and that states must allow
them to marry on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.
McClain’s analysis in Chapter Seven of Who’s the Bigot? more fully elaborates
all of these points than I have in this brief Essay. 79
To recapitulate: What are the benefits of Lawrence and Obergefell—
recognizing that denials of equal respect and dignity along with the status and
benefits of equal citizenship to gays and lesbians are not justified by adequate
reasons—over Romer—forbidding illegitimate emotions such as “animus” and
a “bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group”?80 First, Lawrence and
Obergefell avoid the insinuation that citizens (and justices) who oppose gay and
lesbian rights are bigots. To be sure, the dissenters in these cases nonetheless
charge the majority with branding opponents as bigots. This objection was
strained in Romer, though understandable given the majority’s invocation of
“animus” and “bare desire to harm.” The objection is completely off the mark in
Obergefell given the shift from forbidding illegitimate emotions to securing
equal dignity and the status and benefits of equal citizenship.
Second, Lawrence and Obergefell focus on the social meaning of a state of
affairs in the world for those discriminated against—that laws demean the
existence of and deny the status and benefits of equal citizenship to gays and
lesbians—not a state of emotions in the minds of opponents of those rights.
Justice Scalia, in dissent in Romer, contended that the majority had mistaken a
“Kulturkampf,” or culture war, for a “fit of spite.”81 Lawrence and Obergefell
set limits on the “culture war” itself: majorities may not deny basic liberties and
the status and benefits of equal citizenship for gays and lesbians. To recall
Romer, majorities may not create inferior classes and brand them as pariahs,
outlaws, or outcasts.82 As Obergefell put it, “[o]utlaw to outcast may be a step
forward, but it does not achieve the full promise of liberty” and secure the status
of equal citizenship.83
Finally, grounding gay and lesbian rights as Lawrence and Obergefell do
promises to move beyond settling for “grudging” toleration for gays and
lesbians, and toward aspiring to acceptance and respect for them—a more stable
and worthy basis for justifying their rights as equal citizens. All in all, the
Lawrence and Obergefell approach better captures the stakes in the movement
for gay and lesbian rights—the aim is not to block illegitimate emotions but to
secure fundamental rights, equal dignity and respect, and the status and benefits
of equal citizenship for all.
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CONCLUSION
The bottom line is that, no matter what arguments Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinions made for gay and lesbian rights, the dissenting justices cried that those
opinions were tarring religious opponents of such rights with the brush of
bigotry. This suggests that crying bigotry is a rhetorical strategy for mobilization
in the culture war rather than a fair engagement with the arguments in the
majority opinions. Thanks to McClain’s rich and subtle analysis of bigotry,
motives, and morality in the Supreme Court’s gay and lesbian rights cases, we
can see this clearly.

